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Europäische Finanzmarktpolitik in der Krise

Zusammenfassung: Dieser Beitrag untersucht und relektiert, warum in der bisherigen europäischen Krisenstrategie informelle, mitunter regelverletzende Praktiken in der Finanzmarktpolitik fortbestehen, in mancher Hinsicht sogar an Bedeutung gewinnen. Um diese Frage zu beantworten, wird nachfolgend zunächst eine diskurspolitisch und historisch orientierte hegemonietheoretische Heuristik skizziert. Diese ist hilfreich, um die Genese und die Governance-Formen des europäischen Finanzmarktkapitalismus wie auch dessen Krise zu verstehen. Darüber hinaus trägt sie dazu bei, die Merkmale und Besonderheiten einer partiell regelverletzenden europäischen Finanzmarktstrategie zu ergründen, die sich in den beiden zentralen, auch komparativ betrachteten Handlungsfeldern – den krisenkonstitutionalistischen Reformen und der regulativen Finanzmarktpolitik – jeweils spezifisch ausprägt. Die finanzmarktkapitalistischen Machtbeziehungen scheinen sich dabei vorerst im Spannungsfeld zwischen einer kriseninduzierten Politisierung und deliberativen Technokratisierung zu reproduzieren und mit ihnen auch die Schwierigkeiten, eine demokratisch verträgliche und effektive Regulierung zu etablieren.

Schlüsselwörter: Finanzmarktpolitik • Krise • Europäische Union • Hegemonie • Diskurskoalition • Informelle Politik

The Crisis of European Financial Market Policy

Abstract: This article studies and relects on why the present European crisis strategy includes a financial market policy that continues to contain informal practices that may even occasionally violate the rules and why these practices have gained significance in some respects. In order to address this question the article first outlines a hegemonic theory heuristic inspired by discourse political and historical views. This heuristic is useful in order to understand the inception and governance of European financial capitalism as well as its current crisis. In addition, it contributes to examine the features and particularities of a European financial market strategy that violates the rules in part. This strategy takes on a particular form within the two main fields of action which are also considered in a comparative perspective: crisis constitutionalist reforms and regulatory financial market policies. In both contexts, the power relations of European financial market capitalism tend to be reproduced within the tense relationship between a crisis-induced politicization and deliberative technocratization. At the same time, this also revives the issue of establishing democratic and effective forms of regulation.

Keywords: Financial market policy • Crisis • European Union • Hegemony • Discourse coalitions • Informal politics

The financial players across Europe, apart from central bankers, became aware surprisingly late in the day how the internal market was likely to affect them. With a handful of exceptions, banks, insurance companies and stock exchanges took little part in the agitation for the single market and in most member states: the time lag between the Act in 1986 and active awareness could be measured in years rather than months. (Middlemas 1995, S. 473)

Revolving doors between financial enterprises and market watchdogs have become a common phenomenon. Leading experts are moving between regulatory bodies and private enterprises fuelling a spiral of innovation: enterprises seek to exploit loopholes in regulation to introduce new products – for example subprime mortgage or securitised assets – with which public authorities have to come to terms. (Gottwald 2012, S. 133)

 
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